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Abstract
In VoC theories, adopted in OECD countries, 
the state does not fulfill an important role in 
the productive system. On the other hand, by 
analyzing the trajectory of the semi-periphery 
countries, there is no way to describe the 
mechanisms of institutional complementarity 
without holding the state in the center of the 
model. That’s the trajectories of Brazil and India. To 
evaluate the role of the state as a strategic actor 
in semiperipheral institutional complementarity 
this proposal suggests analyze the role of the 
state in the commanding heights of economic 
liberalization. In particular, the role of public 
banks and pension funds as anti-cyclical and 
coordinators actors of the new corporate 
ownership restructuring and external insertion 
adopted by large conglomerates in Brasil and 
India in the past ten years. Understanding this 
is crucial to point out the limits of theories of 
varieties of capitalism, providing assistance to 
expand its analytical scope.
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Resumo: 
Nas teorias de Variedade de Capitalismo (VoC) , 
adotadas nos países da OCDE , o Estado não cumpre 
um papel importante no sistema produtivo. Por 
outro lado, através da análise da trajetória dos 
países da semiperiferia , não há nenhuma maneira 
de descrever os mecanismos de complementaridade 
institucional sem incorporar o Estado no centro 
do modelo. Essas são as trajetórias do Brasil e da 
Índia. Para avaliar o papel do Estado como um ator 
estratégico na complementaridade institucional 
semiperiférica esta proposta sugere analisar o papel 
do Estado nos altos comandos da liberalização 
econômica. Em particular, o papel dos bancos 
públicos e fundos de pensão como atores anti-
cíclicos e coordenadores da nova reestruturação 
societária e inserção externa adotada por grandes 
conglomerados no Brasil e na Índia nos últimos dez 
anos. Compreender isto é crucial para apontar os 
limites das teorias de variedades de capitalismo, 
prestando assistência para expandir o seu escopo 
analítico. 
Palavras-chave: variedades de capitalismo; Brasil; 
Índia; complementariedades institucionais, 
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Introduction
One of the crucial questions in the trajectory of market-oriented reforms in the global semi-periphery is to understand the State’s  regulatory capacity, especially 
in the employment of the financial instruments at its disposal, contributed towards 
the emergence of a new structure of corporate property and a new productive 
regime. The trajectory of embedded neoliberalism observe in the semi-periphery 
has the potential to reinforce the dichotomies of national productive regimes, to the 
extent that internationalized tend to orient their investment, innovation, supply chain 
articulation and restructuring decisions (in other words, decisions that imply gains and 
losses in terms of income and employment) according to market strategies that are not 
complementary to the domestic economy (Kurtz and Brooks 2008).  To what extent did 
the financial instruments controlled by the State contribute to increase of reduce this 
dichotomy, reflected in the pattern of integration if internationalized countries with 
the domestic economy, as well as in the duality in terms of access to rights and income 
between the formal or precarious social strata? 
What is relevant for the general argument of this article is to emphasize that the 
accommodation of coalitions in the context of market-oriented reform in Brazil and 
India has found in the State the fundamental coordinator, largely supported by its own 
financial institutions in charge of allocating investment and credit. These institutional 
investors guarantee capital for the corporative adaptation in international settings at 
the same time they legitimize and accommodate conflicts of interest within the social 
coalition. The institutional investors act as a bloc of shareholders and seek to discipline 
and regulate the mechanisms of this new financial capitalism. 
Through this analytical perspective, I consider that it would be possible to evaluate 
the role of the State as a strategic actor in institutional complementarity in countries 
of the semi-periphery. Particularly, through the role of public banks and pension funds 
as counter-cyclical actors and the coordination of a new restructuring of corporative 
property and the international inclusion pursued by Brazil and India in the last ten 
years. The understanding of this aspect is crucial to point out the limits of the theory of 
varieties of capitalism, offering support to expand its scope of analysis. 
Models of governance
A significant portion of the literature on corporative governance focuses on the 
shareholding, which impacted on the transformation of corporate culture revolution, 
the developed under the leadership of Wall Street (Ho 2009). The center of this 
transformation was, evidently, the United States, where until the 1970s the corporation 
was deemed a stable social institution, responsible for the negotiation of multiple 
constituencies, evaluated within a long term interval that went beyond trimestral 
bottom lines. After the emergence of investment banking, in the wake of the 1980 
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recession, Wall Street stipulated a new pattern in the cycle of corporate compensation, 
led by a set of financial institutions and networked agents (investment bankers, mutual 
and pension funds, stock exchanges, hedge funds and private equity companies) 
which incorporated a particular ethos, constituted by practices that became the 
cutting edge of globalized capitalism in the United States. These actors linked in 
networks, also became the carriers of financial theories and models that not only 
analyzed and described financial markets but also ‘performatised’ them (Callon 1998; 
Mackenzie 2006). This trajectory consolidated one of the pillars of the neoliberal model 
market economy, crucially focused on a pattern of scattered shareholders, in which 
proprietors and administrators are separated. This trajectory became consolidated 
particularly in the United States and became the cornerstone of orthodox economic 
discourse, although this cannot be generalized to include all capitalist economies. 
One feature of the varieties of capitalism literature concerns the effects of the 
financing patterns on productive regimes. In the coordinated market economy model, 
the role of banks as mediators is predominant and complements the other variables, 
characterizing what has been dubbed “patient capital.” In this variety, the returns on 
investments take place in the long run and the ownership network established by 
banks ensures of the fluctuations in employment, income technological levels and so 
on (Hall and Sosckise 2001; Albert 1993). Unlike what one could imagine in a context 
in which the corporate Anglo Saxon model hegemonic model prevails, the diffuse 
shareholder ownership model is not so common around the world. The fundamental 
question is that corporate governance systems vary not only among countries but also 
in the course of time in each country (Rajan and Zingales 2003). In most cases, whether 
in developed or developing countries, activism on the part of large stakeholders still 
plays an important role in corporate governance (La Porta et al 1999).
The system of corporate governance reflects public policy choices. Countries 
approve laws that configure incentives that, in turn, constitute systems of governance. 
Countries with strict anti-insider information trade rules and strong protection for 
minority shareholders and effective anti-trust regulations tend to follow diffuser 
ownership patterns and oversight through councils elected by shareholders. On the 
other hand, countries that adopt a bloc ownership model allow pyramid-shaped 
leverage systems and cross ownership, limiting competition and undermining 
protection for minority shareholders. In this context, interest groups fight for laws 
and regulations and can gear their preferences according go their position in the 
governance system (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). 
Considering that politics is the independent variable to understand models of 
corporative governance and the possibilities of change over time, it is necessary to 
identify actors and how their preferences are organized within political institutions. 
According to the model proposed by Gourevicht and Shinn (2005), shareholders, 
administrators and workers develop distinct preferences regarding the regime 
of corporate governance. Furthermore, as there are more than one functions of 
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preference for each group, different coalitions can be created. Owners administrators 
can be come allies to contain worker demands for salary and safety; workers and 
administrators can come together to ensure jobs and stable salaries in the company 
or, workers and owners can align to limit the costs of the agency of administrators and 
thus preserve the liquidity of investment and pensions. 
One aspect of special interest here – to be further explored ahead – are workers 
who command their own pension funds and those who depend solely of the general 
public pension system. These two segments tend to develop distinct preferences 
in terms of their interests concerning corporate governance, as pension funds also 
become relevant institutional investors and the owners of shares in large corporations. 
This group doubles as workers concerned with income stability and employment and 
as investors with an eye on their investment savings. Depending of the profile of the 
investor, pensions funds – minority shareholders or large players – these actors tend to 
opt for a internal or external oversight mechanisms. 
In order to understand corporate governance it is also necessary to assess how 
the relationship between stakeholders occurs in the decision-making process and 
in the control of corporate resources. Distinct forms of capital (banks, pension funds, 
individuals, families and so forth) posses different kinds of identities, strategies and 
timeframes. Considering the analysis conducted by Aguilera and Jackson (2003), in 
order to understand the national diversity of corporate governance it is necessary to 
understand the gaps in behavior and the institutional regulations that affect capital, 
labor and management. 
One of the most promising theoretical strands useful in explaining the support of 
this kind of policy is coalition transparency (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Shareholding 
of labour unions from state-owned companies through pension funds has expanded 
exponentially in the last few decades, transforming them into actors with vested 
interests in corporate governance. Thus, workers organized in pension funds have 
acquired vested interests to the extent the pension remuneration depends on the 
variable income extracted from participation as minority stakeholders in strategic 
industry sectors of the economy. This union base has linked patterns of corporate 
governance to job security, to the extent that such practices can increase transparency, 
promote accountability and reduce trust hazards.
Research on this type of new activism has revealed unforeseen aspects. Part of the 
literature on corporate governance has associated the emergence of new institutional 
actors to the increase of agency costs and the undermining of minority stakeholders 
rights (Roe 2003). In general terms, the actions of pensions funds was linked to the 
resistance against reforms in the financial systems oriented towards stakeholder 
scattering. More recent comparative studies have shown, first, that movements 
towards stakeholder dispersion has resulted in the expansion and deepening of 
regulation, and that political actors and left-wing parties have acted decisively in the 
political construction of this process (Cioffi and Höpner 2006).1
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In the semi-periphery, as we shall see, it has been hardly different. Pension 
funds and public banks stand out as the main champions of corporate governance. 
However, corporate governance does not mean per se the defense of self-regulation 
of the market, nor an orientation towards stakeholder dispersion, centered on the 
separation between stakeholder/owners and managers. In this scenario, the approach 
that treats institutional investors as the harbingers of morality in financial capitalism 
is pertinent, however this does not imply a sort political surrender to the logic of the 
self-regulated market, as the literature centered around research conducted in Brazil 
and the United States suggests (Ho 2009; Jardim 2009). As we shall see, this is because 
activism of these institutional actors in the semi-periphery is not limited to minority 
stakeholder position without the coordination with other political actors, such as the 
State. Furthermore, the degree of concentration of assets in the hands of these stock 
and credit market actors in the semi-periphery place them in a very distinct position 
relative to their North American and European counterparts, who fundamentally act 
as minority stakeholders with representation of the bloc that controls administration 
councils. 
The State and corporate governance 
The leads provided by the literature on corporate governance are rather 
elucidating since, by establishing coalition patters as a variable to understand 
models of governance, it offers and excellent tool to understand the trajectory of 
internationalization semi-peripheral economies, taking into consideration the changes 
in the incentives and resources of strategic actors. However, considering the emphasis 
on the global semi-periphery, it is necessary to bring back the state to the center of any 
model of corporate governance and propose some coalition models in which the state 
is an active part of the equilibrium among strategic actors. 
Part of the literature seeks to explain the growing significance of pension funds in 
relation to the limited fiscal powers of the State, the change in the equilibrium of power 
among bank and non-financial institutions and the financial services industry. The 
pension funds emerge in a context of withdrawal of the middle class from a distributive 
project of developed based on crossed subsidies or the transference income for other 
groups of consumers’ public services. The intermediate income segments of society 
began seeing themselves as consumers of public goods and expect a level of quality 
similar to the market. In this sense, the functional coherence of the Welfare State, or 
that comes close to that, is being jeopardized by the fragmentation of the electorate in 
rival groups of consumers of public goods, all vying to maximize their lot of resources 
(Clark 2000; Streeck 2012). In this scenario, pension funds or organizations that 
represent them tend to become activists for the rights of minority stakeholders. As 
mentioned above, the variable of distinction in this scenario in relation to the Indian 
and Brazilian context is that in these countries in the semi-periphery pension funds do 
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not exclusively play the role of minority stakeholders. They represent the fundamental 
supporters of public debt – they are the buyers of most public bonds issued. On the 
other hand, a significant part of the strategic economic sectors, they are not only the 
stakeholders, since they are in the control bloc next to public banks under the State’s 
coordination. We shall see how this has become a crucial question among Brazilian 
and Indian institutional investors. 
Public banks and pension funds in corporate governance
One of the central aspects of the market-oriented reforms both in India and Brazil 
is the divestment made by the State by means of privatization of its assets yet without 
necessarily losing its regulatory capacity. The State’s withdrawal from the control of 
strategic companies did not necessarily represent the loss of voice and influence in 
strategic decision in crucial economic sectors. In fact, there are several studies that 
point out not only the maintenance of the capacity of coordination of the State’s 
corporate decisions, as well as the expansion of regulatory power (Naib 2009; Nayar 
2009; Schneider 2009b; Lazzarini 2011). This analytical prism has reinforced the 
Polanyian perspective of the dilemmas of collective action in deregulated markets and 
the need of the State to coordinate them.
The State’s withdrawal from the control of strategic companies did not necessarily 
represent the loss of voice and influence in strategic decision in crucial economic 
sectors can only be understood to the extent we analyze the role of public banks and 
pension funds in the privatization process. This is not the place for a detailed foray 
into this process – to this end it suffices to say that privatization consortia had the 
prominent participation of these financial institutions, which inputted a significant 
amount of capital alongside private actors. It is necessary to emphasize the political 
context in which the bank as well as the pension funds were led to be a part of the 
privatization process. On one hand, the ideological siege of neoliberalism, whose 
rhetoric is centered around the fiscal crisis of the State manifest in the pension deficit. 
The complementary pension system as an active actor in the market serves as the 
antipode of its “poor cousin” the general public pension system. The capitalization 
model competed with the repartition model (Jardim 2009; Grün 2007).
The State as the agent of incremental market-oriented reform did not abandon its 
strategic position in the corporate governance of capitalism. It has, however, redefined 
the margins of maneuver in macro-economic so as to reconcile greater economic 
liberalizations and its consequences in terms of the autonomy of domestic policy, 
taking into account the political and social demands for a share of national income. 
This is the dilemma the literature has sought to qualify as neo-developmentalism. 
What distinguishes this novel form of State activism regarding the previous 
trajectory is the emphasis on adjusting to the market rather than seeking domination. 
The previous brand of developmentalism was anchored in the shift from savings to 
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investment, limitation of real income, and stratified and focused social policy. The 
novelty of the new model corresponds to an expansion public services without 
compromising public accounts generating a significant impact in terms of the 
reduction of inequality (Arbix and Martin 2010). The newfound protagonist role of 
the State represents an agenda adapted to the previous neoliberal consensus whose 
main aim achieve full employment in conditions of financial and price stability. To this 
end, the model shares some traits with previous developmentalism, as exemplified of 
the strengthening of the international political economy focused on the competition 
among nations carried out by domestic companies. However, the scenario in which 
the strategy unfolds is no longer that of protectionism. The legacy of reforms that led 
to economic liberalization and macroeconomic policy that created price stability were 
not only incorporated but also outlined a new model. Thus, the set of counter-cyclical 
social policies of the period did not truly infringe the tenets of orthodox fiscal and 
monetary policy (Ban 2013). What moderated these restrictions and created a margin 
of maneuver for a strategic intervention of the State was the possibility to employ 
public banks and pension funds.  As an instrument insulated from the Executive 
branch, whose endowments are not subject to the Legislative’s scrutiny, public banks 
were and still are the main comparative institutional advantage of the government in 
terms of development policy (Mettenheim 2010). 
Unlike Brazil, however, the instruments of coordination of the Indian State do 
not seem to have been capable of fostering growth at the same time as employment 
and income expansion, as in Brazil during the last ten years. The expectation that 
manufacturing would lead the generation of productive jobs with trickle-down effects 
in the rest of the economy proved to be unrealistic. During this whole period market-
oriented reforms in India, the growth of salary incomes was always below the level of 
productivity, combined with low employment elasticity in the most dynamic industrial 
sectors, and especially the services sector.  
The ambivalence of a new form of State activism in a macroeconomic context 
full of restriction becomes clear in the way the so-called “commanding heights” of 
the state and the corporate world interact. The associations between institutional 
investors under the coordination of the State and private stakeholders established a 
degree of mutual interdependence and disciplining that confers visibility to a new and 
complex games of allegiances that needs to deal with a scenario of strong demand 
for distribution and a monetary and currency configuration that intensifies external 
competition and affects the variables of external competition and affects variables of 
employment and income. 
By emphasizing the centrality of state activism this article contributes towards 
unveiling one of the aspects of political sociology of a literature that has been seeking 
to explore a new pattern of development consolidated in the last ten years in the global 
semi-periphery.  By turning to a dimension of corporative governance and identifying 
its strategic actors this investigation seeks to evaluate how corporate coalitions, to a 
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great extent brought together by State-led financial mechanisms outline the inclusive 
dimension of the model of growth. In a democratic context in which public policy 
linked to the budget possess a rather limited degree of liberty, the possession of 
financial instruments such as public banks and pension funds consolidate an arena of 
coordination between public and private interests of significant part of the economy. 
The business sector at large in all sectors of the economy need to negotiate corporate 
decision with large creditors and shareholders and, among them are included the 
pension funds representing workers and public banks representing the State. 
Interest groups and their preferences in Brazil 
Entrepreneurs who seek to internationalize do so to increases gains in terms of 
scale and, to this end, need capital to make share acquisition. However, these capitalists 
cannot expand their participation in the capital of other companies without diluting 
their own capital, and thereby risk an aggressive takeover. Thus, the presence of 
financing institution such as the National Bank of Social and Economic Development 
(BNDES) and the pension funds, endowed with shareholder participation with veto 
power over mergers and acquisitions, has served as a roadblock to the process of 
internationalization. 
The State, through public banks, and the syndical base of internationalized sectors 
of the economy, through pension funds, have been active in the restructuring with 
the national entrepreneurial community. This process began during the market-
oriented reforms and not necessarily new in Brazilian corporate history (Evans 1979), 
when private actors participated in the privatization consortia intertwined with state 
and pension fund actors. Up until then, public banks and pension funds would input 
capital with minority partners, had a golden share but did not have voice nor arbitrated 
in corporative decisions, as became very clear in the case of the rumors in the case of 
privatization of the telecommunications sector. The government preferred to auction 
the shares of the controlling bloc instead of making public offers of shares, because 
this would guarantee the best alternative for the capture of price control and, thus, a 
larger volume of resources to reduce the public debt.2 In order to guarantee greater 
efficiency in this strategy, the government approved article 254 of Law 6404/76 that 
guaranteed to minority stakeholders the right to sell their shares at the same price paid 
to the controlling group in the case of an asset transfer, an instrument know as the “tag 
along.” This measure evidently undermined minority stakeholders and guaranteed 
the government the upper hand in all privatization sales. On the other end, the law 
allowed companies to issue shares without voting prerogatives (preferential votes) in 
an amount of up to two thirds of the total stock of capital. This allowed that the control 
of one country could be guaranteed with only 1/6 of total capital (Gorga 2006). With 
the consolidation of the new rules of corporate governance in the financial market 
and the exponential growth of variable assets in the last ten years the BNDES pension 
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and participation funds have become central actors in most all shareholder structure 
restructuring in Brazil. Despite the vertiginous of the financial capitals as a source of 
financing, especially through Initial Public Offerings, the fund for long term financing 
and high risk ventures still depends on public financing agents. 
According to the Center of Capital Market Studies (Cemec), of the R$ 1.2 trillion of 
corporate debt, only 24% (i.e 300 billion) are financed by the financial capital market.3 
Banks, and particularly public banks, are those who guarantee the financing of the 
long term corporate investment in Brazil. Furthermore, considering that the BNDESPar 
and Previ are the main financial actors in the capitals market, at the helm of a portfolio 
worth, respectively, R$ 100.6 billion and R$ 90 billion, it is possible to say with such 
a significant presence of these actors in the capital market implies a coordinated 
mode of financing. There is abundant literature identifying the Brazilian economy as 
a hybrid model in which the State and private actors act in coordination by means 
of the financing of public banks (Stallings and Studart 2006).  The role of the capital 
market still is limited not only in terms of the still small number of companies listed in 
the stock exchange, but also to forms of financing that do not fulfill long term needs, 
since it focuses mostly on working capital. The volume of BNDES disbursements is still 
higher than the volume of resources available via the stock market. In parallel to the 
large investment funds in the capital market there are the State-owned branches and 
pension funds, especially the BNDESPar and Previ. BNDESPar detains the country’s 
largest portfolio, participating directly in 3030 companies and exercising a high level 
of oversight (Schapiro 2010). 
The mechanism that in fact ensures the BNDES’s  capacity to oversee is based on 
the so-called ‘acordo de acionistas’, or shareholders’ agreement, which governs the 
relationship between investors and beneficiary companies. Based on contract clauses, 
the bank formally guarantees participation in the administration of the company 
and backs corporate decisions. The shareholders’ agreement comprises: 1) previous 
consent by the BNDES concerning certain decisions, as, for example, (a) shareholding 
decisions such as the increase or reduction of capital; (b) mergers and acquisitions; 
(c) investment in other areas other than those belonging to the core activities of 
the business; (d) the concession and acquisition of technology; 2) participation in 
the Council of Directors; and 3) free access to the company’s information (Shapiro 
2010). Unlike England and Eastern Europe whose model of privatization was based 
on the strategy of shareholding privatization, the Brazilian strategy was based on 
the selling of control of majority stakeholders. This model applied to 86% of the total 
of privatizations, being that 53% of the buyers participated as associates in mixed 
consortia, made up of private domestic groups, international groups and actors linked 
to the government, basically public banks and pension funds (De Paula; Ferraz and 
Iootty, 2002). 
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Analysis of segments and actor behavior
As mentioned above, the BNDESPar and the pension funds (especially Previ) are the 
main institutional investors in the Brazilian capital market. According to data provided 
by the National Superintendence of Complementary Pension (Previc), until 2011, 
the investment portfolio of the pension fund amounted to R$ 539.7 billion, formed 
by 360 entities and 2.6 million individual members, or 3% of the economically active 
population. The funds’ portfolio is mostly comprised of public bonds (57%) and stocks 
(32.4%).  Brazil ranked 8th in the world in pension funds, being that they represent 
17% of the GDP.4 Although it lags behind leading capitalist countries in terms of 
pension funds, Brazilian pension funds have grown at an annual rate of 15% in the last 
10 years, surpassing all large economies in terms of growth rate, according to Towers 
Watson consultants. As it is impossible to assess all complementary pension entities, 
the objective here is to restrict the analysis to the three largest ones: a Previ, which 
represents the employees of Banco do Brasil;  Petros, the employees of Petrobras; and 
Funcef, which congregates state bank Caixa Econômica Federal’s  pensioners. 
Analysis of funds 
When he left the presidency of the Funcef, after eight years, Guilherme Lacerda 
had consolidated the third largest pension fund in Brazil, whose assets were estimated 
be worth R$ 43.8 billion. According to data provided by the Abrapp, was Funcef the 
second fastest growing pension fund in the last eight years – 327.8%. Cumulative profit 
of fund assets was 300.3%, easily surpassing the target of 46%. Despite the structural 
reduction of interest rates between 2003 and 2010, Funcef did not significantly reduce 
the application of funds in fixed-return investments, but expanded applications in 
variable income fund – a portfolio worth approximately R$ 100 billion. This is the 
largest pension fund in Latin America and the 24th globally, according to a ranking 
devised by Pensions & Investments magazine.5
Next to pension funds, the BNDES’s  holding branch, BNDESPar, has also been 
undergoing rapid transformation. Since 2007, the fund has increased grown five fold, 
increasing its assets from 25 billion Reais in 2007 to 125 billion Reais in 2011. The 
bank’s  “shopping spree” in the context of the financial crisis enabled an enormous 
capacity for debt so that Brazilian companies could turn to acquisitions within the 
country and abroad. This also expanded the direct shareholding participation of the 
fund in the creation of large conglomerates. The company’s portfolio, considering 
share, debentures and funds are concentrated mainly in the oil and gas (36%), mining 
(21,2%), electrical energy (11.7%), food (9.8%), telecommunications (4.4%) and paper 
and cellulose (4.3%) sectors.6  
The State, through its public banks and pension funds, can act as an active member 
in control blocs, with shareholding powers that include vetoes. In the case of mining, 
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energy generation and distribution, transportation, oil, telecommunications, and food 
these institutional investors act as blockholders, with, at least, veto powers. 
Exemplary cases: mining and energy
The case of Vale, the minig company, is emblematic because the BNDESPar and 
pension funds currently hold a majority of the company’s  ordinary shares (with 
veto powers), the power to appoint the president of the administration council 
and joint decision over the company’s  president. When Vale was privatized in 1997 
for US$ 3.3 billion to a group led by Benjamim Steinbruch of CSN, the national steel 
company, BNDESPar and pension funds detained only 35% of shares. In 2011, Vale 
announced a new profit of US$ 6.6 billion and a market valuation of R$ 250 billion, 
while BNDESPar and pension funds accounted for 60% of the company’s shares. What 
led to this extraordinary change and what were the implications on the behavior of 
actors?  The first factor that must be highlighted is that since privatization institutional 
investors never lost the veto power in strategic decisions, a condition acquired once 
a 25% share is achieved. Since privatization, state and private actors, both national 
and foreign, have been adjusting the shareholding structure of the company in the 
attempt to strike a balance to unite this tripartite consortium. Initially, the un-crossing 
of shares between the CSN and Vale in 2001 allowed Steinbruch to leave Vale and 
assume control of the CSN, while Bradesco and Previ expanded participation in Vale, 
assuming control. In 2003, Bradespar sold 18.2% of its part of the bloc to Mitsui, a 
Japanese company, prompting the other partners to thwart the emergence of new 
strategic actors. This move became clear with the acquisition of 11.6% of the shares of 
InvestVale by BNDESPar, blocking the possibility of giving a foreign partner veto power 
in strategic decisions.7 
After 2006, Vale began a cycle of acquisitions internationally and became, next to 
Petrobras, one of the largest companies in Brazil. It is important to highlight that the 
growth of assets of the company through its acquisitions in Brazil and abroad occurred 
in parallel to the expansion of the share participation of institutional investors. At the 
same time, the institutional investors at Vale that were part of the control bloc defended 
a model of corporate governance beyond the reach of the Brazilian stock exchanges, 
the Novo Mercado and BM&F. By planning the acquisition of mining company Xstrata 
in 2008, Vale planed to expand its capital in the London stock exchange, but its request 
was denied based on the grounds that the company would have to abandon its 
share structure model that distinguished between preferential and ordinary shares. 
Controlling shareholders do not admit the merging of shares as this would dilute 
control and create a company with diffused control.8 
Also active in the energy section, the pension funds and BNDESPar play a crucial 
role. Previ has strategic shares in two holdings in the electrical sector: 32% of the capital 
of the CPFL and 39% of Neoenergy. As in the steel and telecommunications sectors, 
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cross-ownership was undone and this allowed funds, in coordination with public 
banks, to chose business groups who would be more willing to follow an investment 
agenda in line with the energy-supply priorities of Brazil in the long term. 
On the other end, in energy generation and large infra-structure works, financial 
innovation led to the creation of large-scale Investment Funds with the prominent 
participation of the BNDES and pension funds. As a result of the demand by institutional 
investors such as the pension funds, in 2009 the National Monetary Council expanded 
the upper-limit of investment in variable income relative to the net assets of the 
pension funds, from 50% to 100%.9 
This change had a direct impact on the creation of investment funds in energy 
generation (such as hydroelectric) and investment in equipment for the oil industry. 
In this regard, Invepar and FIP Sondas stand out. The first was created in 2000 and 
is an investment fund geared towards road infrastructure and transportation, in a 
partnership formed with Previ, Petros and Funcef. The second is an investment fund 
specialized in the construction of deep-sea leads for the exploration of oil in the pre-
salt layer. The fund’s model comprises institutional investors (Previ, Petros, Funcef and 
Valia) and financial actors (Bradesco and Santander) as stakeholders and intends to 
raise US$ 4.5 billion, 80% of which should be financed by the BNDES with resources of 
the merchant marine and the remaining by the other partners.10 In combination with 
the revival of the naval industry, this financial model for the import substitution of lead 
is one of the main wagers in technological innovation to explore the pre-salt frontier. 
Considering the fiscal and credit effort by the State to ward off the crisis in 2009 
and 2010 and keel investment flowing, it is necessary to stress that directed credit 
accounted for 62% of the increase in the stock of credit, further propelled by the role 
of public banks (Barbosa 2010). The Treasury already lent the BNDES more than R$ 300 
billion since 2009, which allowed the bank to promote mergers and acquisitions in a 
context of low international liquidity and high leverage as a result of the subprime 
market. The 2008 financial crisis added an external component in this new effort of 
coordination between pension funds and public banks. Many Brazilian companies 
were highly exposed in currency derivatives at the time of the crisis and became 
insolvent. The BNDES and the pension funds openly acted to promote mergers with 
companies in the same sector so as to achieve global gains in scale. This was the case 
of Sadia and Perdigão, which resulted in the creation of BrasilFoods (with 27.2% shares 
in the hands of pension funds); and of Acacruz and Votorantim, creating (30.4% shares 
with veto rights owned by BNDESPar in partnership with Votorantim). These two 
companies became the two largest conglomerates in their respective fields. 
Considering the new literature on industrial policy (Rodrik 2004), this strategy has 
a few contradictory aspects. On one hand, it develops sophisticated mechanisms of 
risk management and funding and absorbs the externalities of coordination, while in 
the other hand it is uncertain whether that this strategy in sectors that are already 
competitive internationally will entail the development of research in technological 
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frontiers, as the Brazilian industrial policy hopes. This has been the main critique 
of those who evaluate the trajectory of the Brazil in international trade, that is, the 
support to merger and acquisitions provided by the BNDES has favored industrial 
sectors with low technological aggregation (Almeida 2009).
Corporative governance in India
According to data contained in the IMF’s economic overview, in relation to the ten 
largest economies of the world, India was ranked fourth, with a GDP growth rate of 
6.5% and per capita growth of 4.7% between 1990 and 2010. 52% of the GDP in India 
was generated by the services sector, while agriculture and industry accounted for 
22% and 26%, respectively. In terms of employment, rural workers accounted for 2/3 
of the total workforce, being that more than 90% of the total workforce is employed in 
disorganized sectors of the economy.11 
Every time this data appears side-to-side it tends to cause perplexity, specially 
when trying to understand the mechanisms of credit and financing that structure 
the country’s productive regime. An important strand of the literature on patterns 
of financial intermediation has brought attention to the fact that the financing 
preferences vary according to the size of the company. The degree of formalization 
for the access to credit through the capital market and bank in a scenario of acute 
formal (legal) disorganization of contract relationships inhibits access in larger scales. 
For small and medium-sized companies the importance of alternative financing, 
supported by non-legal mechanisms such as reputation trust and reciprocity, and 
which are not originated from bank loans or fund-raising in the capital markets has 
been crucial to ensure growth. Even among the large companies the crucial channel of 
financing are internal sources, followed by alternative sources. 
This does not imply that bank financing or market capital funds will not produce 
results in terms of investment and growth capacity. However there is a set of rifts 
related to the size of the company and participation (or non-participation) in the 
capital market. As in Brazil, in India the capital market is not the mains source of 
credit for investment in large companies. On the contrary, corporations in strategic 
sectors refuse to open capital or negotiate shares with direct control. Usually, the state 
keep veto power over the companies of the sector. As the informal sector in India is 
larger than Brazil, the role of informal mechanisms of financing is evidently bigger in 
the Indian case, but the strategic  industrial of these countries are intertwined with 
the sources of credit provided by state banking. If the weight of these non-formal 
mechanisms of access to credit is, on one hand, associated to the huge informality 
of the labor market, and, on the other, it tends to be a counter-weight guaranteeing 
the Indian State’s capacity of financial coordination. This gap regarding the size of the 
company and access to financing constitutes one of the determinants of the trajectory 
of integration of the Indian economy in the context of globalization.
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The trajectory of privatization in India, called divestment, consisted of a reduction 
of government equity participation in companies, yet without loss of veto power 
and voice in most economic sectors. Observing the composition of India’s largest 
companies, it is clear that the State is still by far the dominant actor in the economy, 
particularly in infrastructure, finance and oil. Among the 500 most valuable companies 
in India, which together account for 90% of the capitalization of the Bombay stock 
exchange, 60% are part of conglomerates – or business houses as they are called in 
India. This is family business groups still play a crucial role in the Indian corporate 
sector. The ownership structure of these companies is analogous to the pattern of 
Brazilian business groups, characterized by the widespread pyramid-shaped scheme, 
cross-ownership and the use of private companies and non-public trusts as owners 
in companies. In addition to the presence of families as large individual shareholders, 
institutional investors - here understood as government-sponsored mutual funds 
and insurance companies, banks and development financial institutions that are also 
creditors of long-term institutional investors and foreign companies - held more than 
22 % of average shares of large companies in India (Chakrabarti, Megginson, and 
Yadav 2008).
The consolidated literature on corporate governance in India identifies the 
business houses as a crucial instrument. This model emerged from the role of the 
management agent, who was basically the promoter of new ventures that entered 
with a minimum amount of equity capital, raising the rest of funds through public 
offerings or from public financial institutions. This dynamic allowed the emergence 
of conglomerates, concentrating control and decision-making at the apex of its 
structure, coordinating crucial decisions such as direction of investment, allocation of 
Non-financial Indian companies and Sources of Financing 
All companies Large Companies Small and medium-
sized companies 
All 
companies
Large 
Companies
Small and 
medium-
sized 
companies 
Listed 
in stock 
exchange
Non-
listed
Listed 
in stock 
exchange
Non-
listed
Internal 
Sources
45.29 46.6 15.11 58.32 34.51 39.49 11.16
Market 6.47 5.47 9.98 8.09 2,.6 24.87 7.57
Banks 18.18 18.86 25.02 12.18 25.75 19.42 25.92
Alternative 
finances
30.6 29.08 49.89 21.42 36.98 16.21 55.34
Number of 
cases
12,344 4,760 9,014 1,001 3,759 400 8,614
This table offers evidence regarding the origin of funds for non-financial institutions (2001-2005), according to the database elaborated by 
Prowess / CMIE. 1) Internal sources are defined as net income after dividend distribution + depreciation + provisions; 2) financing via market 
includes shares + bonds issued in capital market; 3) bank financing includes debt or loans from banks; 4) alternative financing includes all private 
sources outside the market, whether it by from banks or the capital market.  (based on Allen et al, 2012)
Table 1 – Non-financial Indian companies and Sources of Financing
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profits and the relationship between the various group companies. The control does 
not require a majority or even a substantial minority of shares. It can unfold as cross-
participation in administrative and intercorporate investment advice. At the same time, 
the emergence of these conglomerates converted public financial institutions into 
key actors, since they held the majority shareholding in major Indian companies. The 
use of development banks by the government to promote industrialization assured 
extensive interest in the property and instrument of voice and veto within companies. 
The instrument for this has been the appointment of internal cadres for the board of 
directors of companies (Reed 2002).
State-owned enterprises, which are the major corporate conglomerates, are not 
present in the stock exchange and therefore their source of funding is predominantly 
the capital market. According to the literature, the corporate system in India can 
be described as a hybrid between a outsider with dispersed share ownership 
profile alongside a corporate system based on banks with strong presence of large 
concentration of power in equity ownership of banks, households and other actors 
(Som 2006).
Much of this configuration was originally determined by the regulatory regime 
after independence. One of the primary mechanisms by establishing barriers to private 
investment was the IDRA (Industries Development Regulation Act). Established in 
1951, the law required that all existing industrial units obtain licenses from the central 
government, thus encouraging entry barriers. On the other hand, the industrial policy 
resolution (IPR) established in 1948 has listed various segments of industries whose 
development would occur at the sole expense of the State. This resolution allowed 
the government to create a service sector and public service industries. In 1969, in 
the political context of a new wave of nationalization, the government instituted a 
law that combined industrial licensing with an asset-based classification of monopoly. 
The MRTP (Monopolies and Restrictives Trade Practices Act), required private sector 
business, whose assets surpassed a certain upper-limit, to acquire additional licenses 
to increase investments.
The wave of nationalizations ultimately conditioned measures of market reserve 
and protection to small and medium enterprises to distributive instruments such 
as guaranteed employment. These policies fostered the formation of industrial 
capacities, particularly in engineering, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers and 
petrochemicals. In parallel, the government intervened heavily in the financial market 
during the 1970s and 1980s by means of three instruments: 1) allocation of credit 
through loans to priority sectors and credit approval; 2) controls on deposit and 
lending rates; and construction of an infrastructure bank the licensing of banking 
branches, which ensured significant expansion of a baking-based society. This agenda 
has been achieved through the regulatory role of Reseve Bank of India, enacted in 
1974, encouraging the public to increase their lending to the priority sector by up to 
1/3 or more by the end of the decade banks. After 1980, the RBI raised once again the 
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lower-limit for the proportion of credit to priority sectors to more than o 40% of net 
bank credit to the end of year 1985. Within this overall limit, the RBI stipulated that 
agriculture would receive 16% of net bank credit and, of that amount, the landless and 
small farmers should receive 50% (Panagariya 2008).
Furthermore, 90% of the assets of pension funds and 50% of the assets of life 
insurance were forced to acquire government bonds. State-owned banks control 
about 85% of the sector in terms of share in deposits. The Indian banks lend about 60% 
of their deposits, distributed in the proportion of 39% to public sector enterprises, 30% 
for discretionary corporate loans, 11% for agriculture and 7% for domestic companies 
and 13% for small private companies. Since the last three segments - which together 
account for 31% of bank credit -  are classified as “priority sectors” in India (Bardhan 
2010). One of the objectives of bank nationalization of 1969 and the ensuing wave of 
regulations was to expand access to credit for areas of economy with limited access to 
credit and whose loans guaranteed no return. There is considerable debate concerning 
the effectiveness of the role of state banks in providing credit to undercapitalized 
segments of the Indian economy (Banerjee, Cole and Duflo 2004). There is no doubt, 
however, that compared to private banks, public banks pledged substantially more 
credit to agriculture, rural areas and the government.
Financial Institutions in India
While 90% of the assets of pension funds in India are intended for the financing 
of public debt of the country, this proportion is slightly lower in Brazil - approximately 
65%. The differences between the two countries do not stop there. The degree of 
coverage of pension systems in India is much lower compared to Brazil. Only 20% of 
the workforce relies on some form of security. Apart from this limitation of coverage, 
there is also a divide regarding standard actuarial pay for pension plans that guarantee 
the public sector a major advantage compared to other workers segments. There are 
at least seven forms of pension plans: the Employees’ Provident Fund Organization 
(EPFO) – targeted at employees in the private sector; funds of state enterprises; the 
civil servants; occupational pension schemes (Occupational Pension Schemes or 
Superannuation Schemes); voluntary savings plans with tax advantages; plans for 
unorganized sectors (Asher and Nandy 2006). The regulatory framework for pension 
funds has changed since 2004 when the government launched the New Pension Plan 
(acronym NPS) for all public servants from that year. Up to that point civil servants had 
received pension from a non-contributory scheme, with earnings pegged to prices 
and wages. The diagnosis that sustained the introduction of this new plan was the 
expectation of fiscal unsustainability, supported by evaluations made by the World 
Bank (World Bank 2005). The fact is that the NPS allowed that 50% of assets in this 
scheme of pension funds be invested in stock/equity market, under supervision of the 
PFRDA.12 The stated purpose here was to move away from pension plans with defined 
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benefit to an arrangement based on defined contribution i.e, a shift from an allocation 
model to one of capitalization – a process already well underway in Brazil (Grün 2005). 
To this end, the literature favorable to this model focuses on the use of fund assets as 
a means of fostering liquidity in the stock market, rendering it an instrument of long-
term financing through private equity. On the other hand, this same literature argues 
that the funds are not used as instruments to finance the deficit through the purchase 
of securities (Ashraf 2011). The immediate consequences, as also observed in Brazil, is 
the strengthening of the standard tier-based system of access to rights.
Until 1990 the largest blocs of shareholders of all major Indian companies consisted 
of financial institutions, a position consolidated by the commitment to convertibility 
in loan agreements (loans into shares through direct underwriting of public issues by 
the loaning company). These institutions were fundamentally formed by development 
banks with different vocations, as, for example, the Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI), the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), the Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation of India (ICICI), the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India 
(IRBI). A similar process can be observed in the convertibility agreements offered by 
the BNDES. Until 1991, financial institutions were not committed to overseeing the 
companies in which they were shareholders. Up to then, the objective of financial 
policy in India was to extend loans for industrial development without considering 
the recovery of assets. As a result of ongoing operational reforms since 1991, financial 
institutions have been forced to take responsibility for their lending and investment 
choices. As lenders have become guarantors risk of their investments, there are 
indications that banks began to act more actively in corporate governance in the 
companies in which they have a participation in the ownership structure (Sarkar and 
Sarkar 1998).
While the small investor has a predominant share in the capital market, relying 
on the foreign market; large firms do not draw their source of funding from the stock 
market, nor are they willing to follow their rules of corporate governance. When it comes 
to strategic sectors of the economy a system of internal coordinate funding, supported 
by banks prevails. An example of the monitoring role of public banks can be seen in 
the IDBI, which until 2000 had 470 counselors scattered around 1,026 companies, most 
of whom were employees of the institution; the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC – the 
largest life insurance fund in India) had 124 appointed directors sitting on the boards 
of 171 companies, being half of them retired former employees of the company; ICICI 
has 231 listed companies overseeing 436 (Banaji 2001). At the same time, enterprise-
level studies confirm the importance of debt in capital structure: roughly 4/5 of the 
total external funds to loans and provisions and current commitments originate from 
banks and development financial institutions (Sarkar and Sarkar 2008).
Comprehension of the behavior of institutional investors in the coordination of 
investments in India will enable us to understand the coordination capacity of the 
State regarding corporate investments. Data produced by Khan (2006) shows that 
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the main shareholders of Indian companies are: 1) directors and their relatives; 2) 
corporate groups; 3) foreign investors; 4) the loan institutions, composed of three 
financial institutions and state development corporations funded by the State; 
5) institutional investors, mutual funds state (Unit Trust of India) and three state 
insurance companies of state insurance; and 6) public. Of the six groups, the first five 
can be considered major shareholders or shareholders’ bloc. The high proportion 
of concentrated share ownership by directors and relatives corresponds to the 
predominance of family-owned businesses, a typical feature of corporations in India 
and Brazil. Among other blocks of shareholders are institutional investors groups of 
companies, monopolized by the Unit Trust of India. Financial institutions, on average, 
hold less shares compared to institutional investors. The different types of financial 
institutions separately hold blocks of shares much smaller compared to other 
countries. However, given that approximately 90% of these financial institutions are 
controlled by the government, together they form a much larger compared to more 
homogenous blocks in other countries. The participation of institutional investors - 
mutual investment funds and insurance companies, almost all of which owned by the 
government - is also significant.
The literature has consolidated the assessment that the context of an excessively 
closed economy, abundant supply of credit and lack of selectivity in relation to 
projects chosen to receive subsidies would result in crony capitalism. On one hand, 
over-indebtedness; on the other, the role of Development Finance Institutions as 
shareholders. Until the early 1980s, it was possible to start an industrial project 
by borrowing from state banks and secure control with only 15% of capital. Until 
1991, out of the 528 companies listed on the stock market with sales exceeding R$ 
500 million, 65% of total capital was borrowed. What is more, 20% of these funds 
originated from the three largest state banks. Even ten years after the beginning of 
economic liberalization, a substantial fraction of the shares of companies in the Indian 
private sector belong to development financial institutions, nationalized insurance 
companies and mutual funds owned by the government, such as the Unit Trust of 
India. What critics point out is that this type of indirect state ownership did not result 
in healthy governance by stakeholding state financial institutions, despite the fact that 
the three major  development financing institutions - IFCI, IDBI and ICICI -  were well 
positioned to play a similar role to the German hausbanks, whether as major lenders 
or as large shareholders (Goswami 2001).
The capacity of the Indian State to remain in the commanding heights of the 
economy even after the period of market-oriented reforms calls for a critical reading 
of this new role. On the one hand, the bank nationalization of 1969 expanded the 
number of branches across the countryside, allowing the expansion of the bank 
system, higher domestic savings and, ultimately, capillary access to credit; on the other 
hand, the persistent degree of informality in the labor market, which borders 90%, 
India is situated at a level of informality of financial intermediation whose pattern is 
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not coordinated by the banks. What is perhaps more productive in analytical terms 
of analysis is to understand how operational reforms of public banks in the context 
of liberalization of the 1990s contributed to increase even more the opportunities 
for banking inclusion as had been done until the beginning of the reforms (Santana 
2012). In other words, how is it possible to comprehend the standards of financial 
intermediation as an element of corporate governance that determines sectors of the 
economy that will successfully integrate into dynamics of globalization, while the rest 
of the economy does not articulate with the dynamic and internatinalized segments 
and act as a reserve labor with low productivity?  Although the theory of economic 
enclaves is usually associated with theories of imperialism, the insertion of India in 
the global economy follows a pattern of economic dualism that is very similar to the 
models criticized by dependency theories.
India is perhaps the exemplary case of economic dualism, which means a large 
gap in productivity between workers in the organized and unorganized segment of 
the economy. What the literature has highlighted is such dualism is based on distinct 
patterns of access to capital for investment, with large companies absorbing resources 
provided by banks at subsidized interest rates, while the rest of the economy relies 
on informal sources with higher interest rates. The dualism ultimately reinforces 
the reproduction of labor without industrial skills, complemented by a state-led 
educational policy that favors targeted qualification for intensive segments in 
capital and technology, while basic education is unsatisfactory. The legislation for 
the protection and encouragement of small-scale industry enhances the replication 
of small units that have no incentive to expand in scale and productivity (Mazumdar 
and Sarkar 2008; D’Costa 2003). In addition, the finance establishment has restricted 
the possibility of growth-oriented strategies to maintain equivalence wages with 
productivity growth. According to the literature, it has been possible to verify since 
the beginning of the reform agenda greater domestic and external deregulation of 
financial flows, a deflationary bias (transmitted to domestic macroeconomic policies), 
and a diminished possibility of targeting the credit to strategic sectors and labor-
intensive (Ghosh 2011).
Conclusion
Part of the literature on corporate governance in Latin America attributes 
ownership concentration to the standard hierarchical model of control. This pattern is 
supposedly due to the lack of effective separation between management and control, 
the predominant role of family ownership and the existence of multi-sectoral clusters 
(Schneider 2008). The mechanisms of institutional complementarity in a hierarchical 
market economy do not yield enough increasing returns that could result in the 
displacement of the technological scheme of production. Thus, multi-sector business 
groups restructure themselves to overcome the high degree of macroeconomic 
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volatility in the market and to defend themselves from the competition, regardless of 
complementary technology among sectors or of them being part of the same supply 
chain. With multinational corporations dominating high-tech manufacturing, domestic 
business groups are concentrated in low-technology sectors such as commodities and 
services with a lower incentive to invest in Research and Development. Multinational 
corporations in turn choose to invest in markets with products and established 
technologies and foreseeable market demand. Lastly, the state is seen as the institution 
that historically reinforced the core characteristics of hierarchical market economy 
since it regulated the market for capital, labor and technology (Schneider 2009a).
Schneider’s analysis employs a kind of generalization quite similar to that made 
by Lazzarini (2011). They see the strategic actors in corporate governance as arbitrary 
violators of a market order. The very idea of  hierarchy proposed by Schneider in 
the corporate decision-making structure is a vision that blends the theories of 
patrimonialism mobilized by Lazzarini to understand the prevalence of the state- 
commanding heights state as the central core of equity ownership networks. Despite 
this bias, the authors manage to gather data that demonstrate that the State as an 
institutional investor through public and state-owned banks produced a new form of 
equity overlapping and secured momentum so large business conglomerates could 
withstand the onslaught of foreign competition, while guaranteeing at the same time 
funding for global expansion.
With this in mind, this present article seeks to demonstrate that there is no state 
(or para-state) financial patrimonial elite, to which supply chains are subordinated. 
Therefore, nothing indicates this is a variety of capitalism of hierarchical nature. 
Strategic economic actors, both public and private, establish corporate alliances and 
coalitions of mutual interest that have enabled the competitive internationalization 
of relevant industries. Technological aggregation and financial capacity of relevant 
sectors such as civil aviation and agri-business in Brazil, the pharmaceutical and 
software industries  in India could not be comprehended unless as a function of the 
strategic alliances of public financial institutions and state-supported research. This 
article performed a financial analysis of these coalitions in order to understand a 
variety of state-coordinated state capitalism, describing aspects of their institutional 
complementarities. 
Notes 
1 See interview with the president of Previ, the Bank of Brazil workers’ pension fund: Consuelo Dieguez, 
“Sérgio Rosa e o Mundo dos Fundos”, Piauí, edição 35, agosto de 2009.
2 Only 5% of total sales of the national de-nationalization, carried out between 1991 and 1998, were 
made through public offers, while 91% were made through auctions and 4% offered to employees 
of privatized companies. 
3 Carolina Madil, Anbima quer forçar venda pulverizada de debêntures, Valor Econômico, 04/04/2011
4 Azelma Rodrigues and Luciana Otoni (2011) “Novo xerife dos fundos de pensão aposta em expansão 
do setor, Valor Econômico, 02/05/2011”.
5 http://www.pionline.com/article/20110905/CHART01/110829945 (acesso em 29/02/2011).
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6 Leila Coimbra, Compra de ações pelo BNDESPar já atinge R$ 42 bilhões, Folha de S. Paulo, 01/07/2011.
7 Ivo Ribeiro e Silvia Fregoni, Com fundos e BNDESPar, governo retomou controle, Valor Econômico, 
04/04/2011.
8 Vera Durão e Janes Rocha, Novo Mercado? Não, obrigado, Valor Econômico, 15/11/2009.
9 Julianna Sofia, Fundos de pensão poderão correr mais riscos, Folha de S. Paulo, 25/09/2009.
10 Vera Durão, Previ entrará na Sete Sondas, criada pela Petrobrás, Valor Econômico, 24/02/2011.
11 IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011 (accessed on http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx); The disorganized sector of the economy includes, according to the 
official definition (1) all enterprises, except for units listed in Section 2 m (i) and 2m (ii) of the Factory Act of 
1948, and Bidi and cigar workers (work conditions) Act of 1966, e (2) all enterprises, except those managed 
by the central government (central, state  and municipal agencies.
12 Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority.
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